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inevitable because the inflation tax, with sufficient financial adaptation,  can 
be almost entirely evaded and hence the budget deficit cannot be  financed. 
The  Olivera-Tanzi  effect,  the  shortening  of  contracts,  and  financial 
adaptation  all  react  in  a  perverse  way  (from  the  point  of  view  of 
stabilization)  in  that  they  widen  the  deficit  and accelerate  explosively  the 
inflation process. 
4.4  Concluding Remarks: Why Stabilization Is Difficult 
The preceding discussion has an immediate bearing on the fact that stabiliza- 
tion is difficult and, more often than not, takes more than one attempt to succeed. 
In  the  process  of  high  inflation  all  institutions  melt.  When  stabilization  is 
undertaken,  there  is  neither  immediate,  spontaneous  resumption  of  longer 
adjustment periods for wages and prices, nor an instant increase of real money 
demand to noninflationary levels. As a result, more sizable adjustments in the 
budget  are required and more dramatic measures  are necessary to create the 
confidence that stabilization will last.  Because the fiscal measures have to be 
extremely large,  they  are also extremely difficult and  hence often cannot be 
sustained. When they fail, inflation returns instantly at an exceptionally high level 
because institutional inertia has not recovered. 
We  will see in the next chapter how  incomes policy-freezing  exchange 
rates,  wages,  and prices-can  be an effective supplement  to the  inevitable 
budget cut. It makes up for institutional inertia and, to that extent,  gives a 
government  a better chance  to start stabilization.  But, as is clear from the 
experiences  of  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Peru,  failure  to correct  the  budget 
means that high inflation will soon return. The decline in the ratio of M1 to 
GDP that occurred in 1980-85,  shown in figure 4.3, was not fully reversed 
in the initial  stabilization.  As a result,  financing  even a moderate deficit is 
much more inflationary than it was prior to the experience of extremely high 
inflation.  This  hysteresis  effect  of  high  inflation  (similarly  apparent  in 
contracts,  pricing,  and  tax  collection)  sharply  reduces  the  chances  of 
stopping inflation with anything short of a dramatic budget cut. 
5  The Austral Plan 
In early 1985 Argentina moved to the very brink of economic disintegration. 
The rate of price increase accelerated by the month, reaching an annual rate 
of 6,000, and was still rising. At this stage the government made a decisive 
move: recognizing both the need for austerity measures and the political and 
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heterodox  Austral  Plan  was  conceived,  combining  traditional  monetary 
reform with incomes policy. 
It is certainly not an exaggeration to claim, with two years’ hindsight, that 
this plan was dramatically  successful in arresting the disintegration process 
and providing breathing space in which to address the deep-seated fiscal and 
growth  problems.  In  this  chapter  we  discuss  the  first  year  of  the  Austral 
Plan,’ and then turn in the following chapter to the central challenge of fiscal 
reconstruction and growth. 
5.1  General Remarks 
Among  the  key  features  of  the  stabilization  program  were  the  use  of 
wage-price controls,  a fixed exchange rate, fiscal correction,  and  a signifi- 
cant expansion  in the  nominal quantity  of  money.  A conversion  table was 
introduced to adjust existing contracts to the disappearance of inflation.  The 
combination of fiscal correction and incomes policy has come to be known 
as  “heterodox”  stabilization  policy,  thus  opposing  it  to  the  conventional 
IMF programs,  which  emphasize  tight  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  as the 
exclusive instrument of  stabilization. 
A main point of  this  chapter  is to isolate the precise role played  by  the 
heterodox features of the program. Our point is that these features provide an 
immensely  valuable  breurhing  spell  during  which  price  stability  can  be 
established without creating recession.  The resulting strong political support 
for the program and for the policymaker yields a platform from which can be 
made  the  inevitable  adjustments  in  the  budget  that  are  the  pillars  of 
stabilization. We  note that mistaking the breathing spell for success and the 
failure to use the political  support at its height for the difficult task of  fiscal 
correction will mean that the program must soon slip. And when it does slip, 
it often does so irrecoverably. 
The focus then  is  on how  these  programs,  unlike  traditional  programs, 
provide an immediate, temporary opportunity  for basic policy reform. Even 
if they do not afford “magical”  relief from the necessity of fiscal correction, 
they surely represent a significant opportunity to try to achieve policy reform 
in cases where before it had always proved impossible or was overly delayed 
because  of  the  perception  that  there  would  be  enormous  political  costs 
associated with high unemployment  and slow disinflation. 
Stabilization  has  two  dimensions:  the  program  may  or may  not  include 
fiscal correction or austerity, and it may or may not have an incomes policy 
(wage,  price,  public  utility,  and  exchange  rate  freezing,  together  with 
remonetization  as  explained  below).  The  standard  program  is  the  IMF 
approach in which there is fiscal austerity but incomes policy  is not a key 
instrument. It is true that orthodox programs favor wage restraint,  but price 
controls are never an item on the conditionality  list.  On the contrary, price 
liberalization tends to be an element of these programs. Heterodox programs, 
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Stabilization  without  austerity-that  is,  relying  merely  on  incomes 
policy-is  not a viable approach. The most common form of this approach is 
to attempt stabilization by controls only, without paying attention to the sine 
qua  non  of  fiscal  correction.  History  is  crowded  with  some  thousands  of 
years’ worth of examples of failed experiments,  from Emperor Diocletian to 
the modem day experiments of the Peronists in 1973-74,  of  U.S. President 
Richard  Nixon,  of  Israel  in  early  1985,  and  of  the  Brazilian  cruzado 
programs. Inevitably these programs end after a more or less brief period of 
effectiveness,  failing  when  shortages  have  become  a  significant  political 
headache. Eventually the “patient,”  often too late, is rushed to the IMF. 
There is another dimension along which programs might be distinguished. 
Programs can be orthodox or heterodox, and they can involve gradualism or 
shock treatment.  In  this classification the present programs  are  “heterodox 
shocks”  or treatments. An example of a heterodox-gradualist program would 
be  the  Brazilian  Campos-Bulhoes  stabilization of  1964-67.  An  orthodox- 
gradualist program might be the case of Chile. It is more difficult to cite an 
orthodox-shock example, perhaps because of a lack of survivors to recount 
the episode. 
The chapter  is  organized  as  follows:  In  sections  5.2 to  5.4 we  review 
conceptual issues related  to the use of incomes policy in stabilization when 
inertia  is  a  central  feature.  The discussion  includes  the  relation  between 
deficits and inflation studied in the preceding chapter, inertial inflation,  and 
the basics of monetary reform.  In sections 5.5 and 5.6 we review the actual 
stabilization  experience  in  Argentina.  The  chapter  concludes  with  a 
discussion of the political dimension of stabilization,  showing the extraordi- 
nary political popularity of the new programs. 
5.2  Incomes Policy and Stabilization 
In this section we review the analytic case for wage-price-exchange  rate 
controls as an essential, but transitory,  complement to the fiscal stabilization 
which,  as already  noted,  is the  sine  qua  non  of  successful  anti-inflation 
policy. 
Economists  and  well-advised  policymakers  have  long  known  that 
aggregate  demand  discipline  is  a  necessary  condition  for  sustained  price 
stability. Yet  it may not be sufficient to stop inflation, or it may fail to work 
under conditions  of  tolerable  unemployment.  This is demonstrated  by  the 
failure of a number of IMF-supported  programs which ignored the problem 
posed  by  inflationary  inertia.  The  result  of  this  disregard  is  that  IMF 
programs often lead to dismal stagflation and eventually to a resumption of 
expansion and little or no success at permanently reducing inflation. 
Not  surprisingly, countries  such as Argentina, Israel,  and Brazil  recently 
decided to focus on the supply side of inflation, attempting to stabilize prices 
by  combining  incomes  policy  with  “monetary  reforms.”  Whether  or not 
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including,  importantly,  aggregate  demand  management.  The  ovemding 
lesson from the ongoing experiments is the need for sound respect for fiscal 
discipline and the need to recognize that a good dose of initial overkill may 
be a necessary ingredient for success. 
One interesting point is that  such experiments  were  inspired by  a sound 
game theory  approach to inflation.  It can be  argued,  as we do below, that 
an incomes policy  is needed  in order to coordinate individual behavior in a 
way  not  recognized  by  oversimplified  versions  of  a  rational  expectations 
economy. The central issue is to understand what causes inertial inflation and 
how incomes policy can break the dependence of the inflation rate on its past 
behavior. 
5.2.1  Inertial Inflation 
A starting point for a discussion is to recognize that a large part of high 
inflation is essentially  inertial. This observation  applies equally well to the 
United  States,  Europe,  or  Latin  America.  Inertial  inflation  means  that 
inflation  today  is  approximately  what  it  was  yesterday.  Let  IT  be  current 
inflation,  IT-,  be  last  year’s  inflation,  and  Gap  denote  the  economy’s 
cyclical position.  The actual rate of  inflation would then be: 
(1)  IT  = IT-,  + ~GUP  + V, 
where v denotes current period supply shocks. The essential point of modem 
inflation  theory  is that  inflation  is linked  to  the  past  through  a  variety  of 
channels. It is not only “too much money chasing too few goods,” or supply 
shocks such as oil or agricultural price increases,  or real  depreciation,  but 
also that inflation yesterday means inflation today. 
The reason for this persistence  of  inertia is primarily formal or informal 
indexation interacting with  staggered wage setting.  This may take the form 
of  a legally imposed wage rule, or it may also be that much more informal 
wage bargaining leads to the same result.  The same mechanism also works 
by means of expectations.  In setting their prices, firms will have to estimate 
their own cost increases  and the price  increases of competing  firms. Their 
best guess is that,  cyclical  and  supply  shock  factors aside, inflation  today 
will be approximately what it was yesterday. 
Because  everybody  shares  this  best  guess,  the  public  acts  on  these 
expectations and sets prices accordingly, without hesitating to give matching 
wage  concessions.  It  is  much  easier to give  wage  increases  in  line  with 
expected inflation than to run the risk of a strike.  If everybody  acts in this 
manner,  then  expected  inflation  turns  out  to  be  actual  inflation;  and  if 
yesterday’s  inflation  is the benchmark, then today’s inflation  will be  much 
the same as it was in the past. 
Cyclical  factors  and  supply  shocks,  including  a  need  to  depreciate 
exchange rates to cope with a debt crisis, are the chief reasons that inflation 
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equal,  would  tend  to  result  in  rather  stable  inflation,  but  the  additional 
elements can cause inflation to move and often to move sharply. The cyclical 
factor is quite obvious; it is simply demand inflation or the cooling down of 
inflation  due to slack in activity and employment. But it is worthwhile  to 
recognize an asymmetry: there is no upper limit to firms’ price increases in 
response  to excess  demand,  but  in reverse  the  argument  does  not  apply. 
Stopping  an  inflation  of,  say, 400  percent by  using  slack is very difficult. 
Even  as  restrictive  policy  reduces  nominal  spending, firms  are forced  to 
make  wage  concessions  based  on past  inflation.  Their cost  increases  thus 
might be on the order of 400 percent,  and it is quite inconceivable that they 
would  be  able  to reduce  inflation  significantly  simply  by  reducing  profit 
margins.  In the same way, reducing wage settlements below  the prevailing 
rate of  inflation will not make much of a difference to high inflation. Giving 
a wage increase of 360 instead of 400 percent would mean a very large cut in 
the real wage (8 percent!)  but a very minor reduction in inflation. 
The  idea  of  fighting  inflation  by  using  slack  thus  applies  only  to  an 
economy where wage reductions of  2 or 3 percent,  or cuts on that order in 
profit  margins,  mean cutting  inflation  in half.  When inflation  is very high 
and very inertial, then demand policies have a hard time making a rapid and 
large  impact.  Because  such  an  impact  is  the  only  politically  acceptable 
method,  governments  of high-inflation  countries  have  little hope except  to 
try to stem further inflation deterioration; they cannot see any opportunity to 
actually end inflation. 
In the new stabilization programs this problem is recognized in a way not 
done in the IMF programs.  The need is seen for an incomes policy to break 
the inertial forces and thus instantly shift the economy from a state of high 
inflation  to low.  This incomes  policy  should be  understood  as follows: To 
stop inflation,  someone must  start offering reductions  in profit  margins or 
real wages in order to introduce disinflation.  The initial disinflation can then 
be passed along by indexation onto a path of gradual, additional disinflation. 
Realistically,  there will be no volunteers  for such an approach.  Everybody 
would like to leap together to a low inflation state, but nobody will make the 
leap unless  others  will  join  in.  That means  everybody  wants  to see zero 
inflation before each person will set his own price or wage increases at zero. 
But if everybody adopts a “wait  and see” attitude then, of course, inflation 
will continue.  An attempt to restrict demand would translate almost entirely 
into reduced employment and practically not at all into lower inflation.  The 
dismal  performance  of  the  economy and  the  lack  of  success  in  fighting 
inflation would make any such campaign short-lived. 
5.2.2  Game Theory and Incomes Policy 
The scenario just described puts fighting inflation squarely in the domain 
of  game theory. When economic  agents interact strategically in the fashion 
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system  of  temporary  controls  of  wages,  prices,  and  public  utility  and 
exchange rates  is the  coordinating  device that establishes the  fact of  price 
stability, which the economy left to itself could not establish quickly except 
at extreme  cost. It  might  be  argued  that  if  the  government  undertakes  to 
produce the right kind of monetary and fiscal policy, then the public cannot 
escape  the  conclusion  that  inflation  has  been  left  “dead  in  its  tracks.” 
Everybody  will  respond  accordingly,  with  the  result  that  inflation  will  be 
dead. 
But  there  are  two  separate  and  crucial  holes  in  this  argument.  One 
concerns the government’s inability to precommit credibly to future policies. 
The other, which  is more novel,  concerns the problem of  coordination in a 
world of  price setters. We review these in turn. 
The  government  cannot  commit  itself  definitely,  credibly,  and  beyond 
doubt. The institutional setting for such a precommitment does not exist (one 
thinks  of  constitutional  amendments,  the  gold  standard,  and  whatnot). 
Because the government cannot lock in its policies beyond doubt, the public 
recognizes that there is always some possibility that policy will not change to 
a  noninflationary  stance.  Specifically,  if  the  average  agent  does  not  quite 
believe  that  policy  will  change,  then  all  agents  will  behave  somewhat 
defensively,  resulting  in  some  wage  and  price  increases,  which  force  the 
government to suspend its policy. The expectation that this will indeed be the 
future course persuades the average agent to disbelieve the possibility  of an 
instantaneous end to inflation. 
These  ideas  can  be  interpreted  in  a  game  theory  perspective,  which 
assigns the government  a double task: to ensure credibility of an aggregate 
demand  policy  consistent  with  disinflation,  and to coordinate  the  expecta- 
tions and actions of  individual wage and price setters.  Assume that after a 
prolonged  inflation,  the  Central  Bank  announces  that  it  will  stop printing 
money and the Treasury announces that the budget deficit will be eliminated 
as  a  result  of  increased  taxes  or expenditure  cuts.  Even  if  the  general 
perception is that nominal GNP will be stabilized immediately, prudent price 
setters would not take the lead in stopping sectoral price increases as long as 
they consider that further price increases in other sectors are possible. 
In  a  noncooperative  or  noncoordinated  game  with  many  players,  each 
individual player has little information concerning other players’ payoffs. As 
a result,  there  is  no reason  to believe  that  all  players  will  reach  the  zero 
inflation-full  employment  equilibrium  in  the first move  of  wage  and  price 
setting.  Uncertainty  about  the  behavior  of  other  players  persuades  the 
individual price setter to adopt a very  cautious pricing p01icy.~  How many 
moves  are  required  or  how  long  it  takes  for  the  economy  to  reach  the 
equilibrium  is  an  open  question,  depending  in  part  on  the  learning 
mechanism used by individual agents. 
The speed of convergence may be painfully slow after a prolonged period 
of  high  inflation.  The  more  prolonged  the  experience,  the  higher  the 97  ArgentindChapter 5 
unemployment rate that results when  excessive prices  are confronted  by  a 
given nominal income target that is sustained by the stabilization policy. The 
higher  and  more  persistent  the  unemployment,  the  more  agents  will  be 
inclined  to believe  that  the  authorities’  determination  will  falter.  Accord- 
ingly, rather than  speeding up their price responses, they may persist even 
longer in their  overly  prudent  disbelief.  After all, the history  of  previous 
stabilization attempts has taught them a lesson. 
The foregoing discussion provides the rationale for an incomes policy: if 
governments transitorily play the role of  the Walrasian auctioneer, they can 
speed  up  finding a  zero-inflation  full  employment  equilibrium.  From  this 
point  of  view,  incomes policy  may  be  required  to  make  economic agents 
behave in  line with rational expectations models. It should be stressed that 
the  central  function  of  controls  is  not  to  constrain  individual  decision- 
making, but to tell each agent how other actors will play, clearing potential 
externalities  in  an  imperfect  information  game.  This  role  of  controls, 
incidentally,  eliminates  a  traditional  argument  against  incomes  policy, 
namely that governments are not better equipped than the private sector to 
discover the equilibrium. In fact, the central problem  is not to identify the 
equilibrium  but to orchestrate the simultaneous playing  of  wage and price 
setters so as to reach the equilibrium. 
A  more  fundamental  contention  is  that  the  temporary  success  of  an 
incomes policy may lead policymakers to forget that price stability can only 
be sustained with aggregate demand discipline. The temptation is to misread 
the price stability and produce a boom.  The misleading  signals are a true 
risk, as can be seen from countless examples in history. Yet  the converse is 
also true.  Trying  to fight a high inflation from the demand  side may only 
lead to stagflation so dismal that policymakers may conclude that life with 
inflation is less uncomfortable  than  life  with  an  IMF-supported program. 
Worse yet, they often reach that conclusion only after a prolonged period of 
recession.  The lesson then is that economists should advocate the superior 
recipe of heterodox programs and, with as much emphasis and urgency, note 
its limitations and temptations. 
Of  course,  the  chances  of  hitting  a  zero-inflation,  zero-unemployment, 
zero-shortage  equilibrium  instantly  using  an  incomes  policy  are  remote. 
Wage-price controls will  almost  inevitably  lead  to  some shortages  unless 
there is a generalized recession that lowers demand. The central question is, 
what is worse in terms of social welfare, a few product shortages that may 
eventually be overcome by imports or a generalized shortage of jobs? From 
this  point  of  view,  objections  to  an  incomes  policy  should  be  balanced 
against the extreme costs of recession and unemployment. This is especially 
true when  the problem  is to  fight a  high  inflation that  has  strong  inertial 
roots. One reason to prefer an incomes policy is that it can be managed with 
appropriate flexibility, across sectors and across time, moving gradually from 
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The case for a coordinating role for an incomes policy owing to information 
externalities arises only when macroeconomic noise and uncertainty are large 
relative to the microeconomic  uncertainties  in each individual market. This 
explains  why,  in  a  second  stage  of  the  stabilization  program,  removing 
wage-price controls gradually, in successive sectoral steps, will result in less 
uncertainty  and  lower  subsequent  inflation  than  removing  controls  in  one 
shot. The one-shot  approach  would  simply  bring  back  the  uncertainty  of 
individual players as to what every other player will do. Then, at the stage of 
liberalization there would  be defensively large price increases which might 
well  wreck  the  inflation  stabilization.  Achieving  consistency  during  the 
removal of controls is thus an important and difficult task. 
5.2.3  Incomes Policy Matching 
We  conclude  this  section  by  noting  that  the  various  instruments  of  an 
incomes  policy-exchange  rates, wages, public  and private  sector  prices, 
and the nominal money stock-must  be carefully matched.  Failure to align 
these policy instruments can easily lead to dramatically poor performance. 
The clearest example of  a poorly  aligned policy  may well be the Chilean 
stabilization of the late  1970s. The budget has not only been balanced,  but 
indeed there was a surplus. Money was under tight control and inflation was 
gradually  declining,  although  very  slowly.  To  speed  up  disinflation,  the 
government opted to stop the exchange rate depreciation that was being used 
to avoid loss of competitiveness in the face of  continuing inflation.  But the 
government failed to recognize that wage indexation,  which was geared to 
the past inflation, meant cost increases for firms without an offsetting relief 
on  prices.  The  exchange  rate  soon  became  grossly  overvalued,  leading 
ultimately to the worst kind of  speculation and financial in~tability.~ 
The need  to match  instruments  also applies to the  money  stock.  AS we 
will discuss in the next  section, successful disinflation  requires determined 
(though careful and limited) monetization of the economy. 
5.3  The Budget and Inflation 
The common perception is that inflation is caused by budget deficits. We 
draw  attention  here  to  two  important channels  that  were  studied  in  the 
previous chapter to show how high budget deficits can result from inflation. 
This  more  unusual  direction  is  important  in  assessing  public  finance  in 
inflationary  episodes  and in developing  a judgment about the  fiscal policy 
changes required to implement stabilization. 
The first reason  inflation  causes  deficits is  the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect  (see 
sec. 4.1.2). Inflation, combined  with lags in tax collection, means that the 
real value of the  tax collection  arriving in the hands of the government  is 
lower the higher the rate of  inflation. If there is 100 percent inflation and no 
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represent only half of the real value of  taxes the government would receive 
without inflation or without lags or if  full indexation existed. 
Of  course,  in  any  high-inflation episode the  lags  in  tax  collection are 
sharply reduced and some form of  indexation will appear, but it turns out to 
be  impossible to make the entire tax  collection fully inflation proof.  Even 
during the Argentine hyperinflation, value-added tax  (VAT) collection was 
monthly  and  income tax  collection was  only  quarterly. Thus,  if  inflation 
rates reach 20 or 30 percent per month, even very  short lags have a major 
effect on the real value of  tax collection. This effect is reinforced from the 
public’s active interest in postponing tax payments in order to effect a large 
reduction in real payments. Charges for late payments and indexation help 
mitigate these problems, but they do not eliminate them. This is particularly 
true if  the charges are not indexed nor geared to real market interest rates. 
The actual relevance of the Olivera-Tanzi effect depends on the tax structure. 
The second interaction between  inflation and the deficit stems from the 
inflation component of debt service. Part of  government outlays will be for 
service of  internal  and  external  debt.  Interest rates  will  reflect  expected 
inflation  and  depreciation.  Because  of  this  link  between  inflation  and 
nominal  debt  service,  two  different  measures  of  the  deficit  should  be 
distinguished: the  actual  deficit  and  the  inflation-adjusted  or  operational 
deficit.  The  former  calculates  the  deficit  taking  full  debt  service  as  the 
measure of debt service, iB  = (r + T)B,  while the latter only includes real 
interest payments (re)  and excludes the inflationary component of  interest 
(W. 
The  rationale  for  this  distinction  is  that  corresponding to  the  inflation 
component of  interest payments is inflationary erosion of the principal. To 
measure the  increase  in  the  real  value  of  government  indebtedness,  the 
inflationary erosion of the debt should be subtracted from the addition to the 
stock of outstanding government liabilities, which is done by  calculating the 
inflation-adjusted or  operational deficit. 
The importance of inflation adjustments in the budget is apparent when we 
think of  a government with a debthcome ratio of, say, 20 percent of GNP, 
and  an  inflation rate  of  200  percent.  The  inflationary  component of  debt 
service is equal to 40  percent  of  GNP.  The actual deficit therefore vastly 
overstates the increase in the  government’s real indebtedness.  If  inflation 
were brought to zero, through whatever means, the budget deficit would be 
reduced correspondingly. 
5.3.1  Money Illusion 
If the public has no money illusion, then its extra saving in the presence of 
inflation will  be just  enough to absorb the inflationary component of  debt 
service. Otherwise, how would it be possible to finance budget deficits of 25 
percent  of  GDP?  There  is,  indeed,  a  serious  theoretical  flaw  in  using 
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increase in the  budget deficit is matched  by  an equal increase in voluntary 
private  savings,  aggregate  demand  will  not  be  affected  at  all.  The 
assumption  that  deficits create  voluntary  savings  in  order to finance  them 
looks  rather  strange,  as  far as  the  adjusted  budget  is  concerned. Yet,  it 
becomes  highly  plausible  when  the  problem  is  to  finance  the  inflation 
adjustment of the public sector debt.  In the case of the foreign debt, this is 
obvious. 
If the public has no money illusion, the same principle applies to domestic 
public sector debt. Bond holders will understand that the inflation adjustment 
of  their  credits  should  not  lead  to  additional  consumption.  Here  again, 
inflation  automatically  creates  the  nominal  savings  needed  to  finance  the 
inflation adjustment of  the government debt. 
Of  course, the  no-money-illusion  assumption  can  be  questioned,  espe- 
cially  in the absence  of  formally  indexed public  sector bonds.  Even  in  an 
economy with widespread indexation, widows and retired workers might use 
part  of  the  inflation  adjustment  of  their  savings  accounts  to  finance 
consumption.  Yet,  two  essential  points  should  be  stressed.  First,  money 
illusion is not likely to be a major problem, otherwise it would be impossible 
to finance deficits of  25 percent of  GDP.  Second, even if  money illusion  is 
important enough to prevent the inflation adjustment of domestic public debt 
from being  financed entirely by voluntary savings,  it brings us back to the 
Olivera-Tanzi effect. Once again, there is a circular cause-and-effect relation 
between  aggregate demand and inflation.  Stopping inflation  will lead to an 
automatic reduction in aggregate demand. 
These  distinctions  between  adjusted  and  unadjusted  deficits  play  an 
important  part  in  understanding  the  rationale  for  the  new  stabilization 
programs. If  a government perceives that most of the deficit comes from the 
inflationary  component  of  debt  service,  and  the  noninterest  budget  is  in 
sufficient surplus to pay the real interest on the debt, stabilization becomes 
more  plausible.  All  that  is  needed  is  a  jump  from  high  inflation  to  no 
inflation. Failure to understand the role of inflation adjustment could make it 
seem that an extraordinary reduction of the deficit through  spending cuts or 
tax increases is required before stabilization can be considered. In this sense 
the famous IMF dictum, “a deficit is a deficit, is a deficit”  is a poor starting 
point  for  analyzing  the  fiscal  fundamentals  required  for  a  successful 
stabilization. 
5.4  Monetary Reform and Monetization 
Stabilization of high inflation often has monetary reform as an important 
and  highly  visible  component.  We  briefly  review  the  essential  features  of 
such a reform.  The first, which is crucial, is to shift contracts  from those 
appropriate  to  an  inflationary  economy  to  those  appropriate  in  a  zero- 
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introduction of  a new monetary unit, the main purpose of which, other than 
‘‘eliminating zeros ,’ ’ is to increase confidence and consolidate expectations. 
5.4.1  Contracts 
In an inflationary environment with high uncertainty, contracts will have a 
very short maturity unless,  like rent contracts,  they are indexed.  Long-term 
capital markets will dry up, but even so, contracts for a month or even six 
months  will  still  exist.  These contracts  specify  nominal  interest  rates  or 
implicit prices that are a reflection of the inflationary expectations prevailing 
at the time the contracts are written. 
For example, with an inflation rate of  10 percent per month, a one-month 
loan contract will carry an interest rate of at least 10 percent per month. Rent 
contracts entered into at any time will involve nominal payments over, say, 
six months that reflect the assumption of increasing prices.  Wage contracts 
will be indexed in a formal or informal manner, so that they are adjusted for 
past  or for future  inflation  when  they  come up for  readjustment.  A  major 
problem  for  inflation  stabilization  is  to take  into  account  the  presence  of 
these contracts and institutions that are in force at the time of stabilization. If 
the  economy  were  to move  instantly  from high  inflation  to zero inflation, 
outstanding contracts and institutions would cause major problems. 
It is immediately obvious that debtors can service loan contracts involving 
very high nominal interest rates only if the inflation expected at the time the 
contract was signed actually materializes.  A six-month loan concluded with 
an inflation expectation  of  10 percent per month would carry  a 77 percent 
interest rate for the  six months. If  inflation  were to disappear,  the nominal 
interest rate of 77 percent would become the real interest rate and, hence, the 
debt service burden would be extraordinarily large. An adjustment in all loan 
contracts is required to avoid a massive,  unintended,  and unfair redistribu- 
tion from debtors to creditors and the attendant risk of pervasive bankruptcy 
and financial instability. 
For  wage  contracts  the  problem  is  perhaps  even  more  complicated. 
Suppose, as would be realistically the case, that wages are readjusted every 
three or six months. Every time a contract comes up for renewal, the money 
wage for the next  three  months  is adjusted upward  for the inflation  which 
actually occurred over the past three  months.  With  such a pattern  of wage 
contracting,  an instant end to inflation  is nearly  impossible.  Just when  the 
government seeks to impose zero inflation, some wage contract is coming up 
for renewal and workers will ask to be compensated for past inflation.  This 
wage  increase  in  turn  creates  cost  increases  and,  inevitably,  inflationary 
pressure.  Accordingly, the transition  to zero inflation needs to be accompa- 
nied by some restructuring of wage contracting to avoid this inertia effect. At 
the  time  of  stabilization,  some wage  earners  will  have just received  their 
adjustment and hence will find themselves in the high real wage position of 
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wages in this situation would be perceived as extraordinarily inequitable and 
hence would serve as an impediment to stabilization. 
Monetary  reform  is  the  broad  term  that  characterizes  the  rewriting  of 
contracts and the  reform  of  institutions  to make  them  compatible with  the 
zero-inflation  target.  In the  case of  wages,  monetary  reform  requires  that 
those who had recent increases,  and hence have high real wages,  must have 
their wages rolled back, while those who are in the low real wage phase need 
upward adjustments. This reform could, in principle, be achieved by money 
wage adjustments using the old ~urrency.~  The confusion of  a new  money 
may, however, help to achieve the transition  in a simplified manner.  Note, 
too,  that  a  new  money  provides  an  important instrument  to  avoid  legal 
complications,  uncertainty,  and challenges to the restructuring of contracts. 
Similarly, for contracts involving future nominal payments,  a new money is 
a means of aligning the real value of payments with the expectations implicit 
at the  time  contracts  were  concluded. A  conversion  scale which  sets  the 
terms for translating the old money into the new according to a set timetable 
of depreciation is the practical  means of  achieving this end. 
Monetary reform can also involve a capital levy on the public in the form 
of  a  write-down  of  monetary  assets. Interestingly,  in  none  of  the  recent 
stabilizations has this been attempted. This fact is all the more noteworthy in 
that, unlike in the  1920s, government debts remained very large and hence 
made  using  a capital  levy to balance  the  budget  particularly  attractive.  In 
Brazil, where domestic public debt accounts for nearly 20 percent  of GNP, 
the  idea  of  a  capital  levy  is  often  suggested.  In  fact,  the  Brazilian 
government used negative real interest rates to reduce the public debt. 
5.4.2  Monetization 
Monetary  reform  also often  includes  a change in  monetary  institutions. 
Along with  a change  in the  monetary  unit, new  institutional arrangements 
are meant to dramatize the end of inflationary  finance. 
The traditional way to signal the new rules of the game is to announce the 
independence of the Central Bank and the end of automatic financing of the 
budget by the printing press. But it is important to read the fine print. In the 
1920s, the stabilizations did involve institutional changes and limitations on 
the access of  the government to the printing press, but that did not result in 
an end to money creation for two reasons.  One was that in some cases the 
transition  was characterized by a large,  once-and-for-all issue of  money.  In 
Germany,  for example, in  1923 the  ceiling  was  set  at 500 percent  of  the 
existing  money  stock.6  But  beyond  this  once-and-for-all  fiduciary  issue, 
there was the second reason: the possibility of the money stock increasing in 
the  course  of  domestic  private  credit  expansion  or  the  monetization  of 
reserve inflows. The experience from the classical stabilizations was one of 
extremely  large  increases  in  nominal  money-several  hundred  percent- 
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The explanation for this large, noninflationary  money creation is obvious. 
During  the  high-inflation  period,  the  cost  of  holding  noninterest-bearing 
money is extremely high. As a result, real balances decline or the velocity of 
circulation increases. This is the famous “flight from money.”  The financial 
system  accommodates  the  flight  from  money  by  creating  highly  liquid 
interest-bearing or indexed  liabilities-the  “overnights,”  which practically 
serve  as  money.  Surely,  a  person  could  not  pay  for  a  taxi  ride  with  an 
indexed bond, but they could transfer funds on any day from an indexed cash 
reserve account to a checking account by a simple telephone call to the bank 
before  10  A.M.  In fact, living without MI was a fashionable and profitable 
exercise in survival. The fact that MI survived at all, even at an extremely 
reduced level, can only be explained by transactions costs. 
In the  course  of  stabilization,  the  reverse  occurs. The disappearance  of 
inflation  raises  the  demand  for  M 1,  or  transactions-based  real  balances. 
Unless deflation increases the real money supply, it  is necessary to increase 
the nominal  money supply by one means or another to avoid extravagantly 
high  nominal  and  real  interest  rates.  A  noninflationary  expansion  in  the 
money  stock  is  needed  to  meet  the  additional  demand  for  money,  the 
well-known reliquification  or velocity  problem.  MI can expand  to replace 
other financial assets without risk of renewed inflation. 
The  problem  is  to  fine-tune  this  expansion  and  to  identify  which 
aggregates must expand. Failure  to expand MI or too gradual  an increase 
means  that  the  economy  will  slide into a recession  because  of  a  liquidity 
crunch. But too rapid or too large an expansion leads to a loss of credibility 
and  the  reigniting  of  inflation.  The  safest  solution  might  well  be  to  set 
growth targets for total  financial assets held by the public, allowing M1 to 
expand as long as other financial assets decline. Thus, if the government can 
accommodate the shift in the composition of  the financial portfolio  without 
expanding the size of the total  liquid  asset portion, then both recession  and 
renewed inflation can be avoided. What are the implications of such a policy 
for broad monetary  aggregates,  such as, for example, M4? Here one would 
expect no major change (relative to GNP) unless there is a significant  shift 
from dollar assets to domestic currency securities. 
5.4.3  Financial Institutions 
A major issue in the sudden end to high  inflation  is the  fate of financial 
institutions  and,  specifically,  that  of  commercial  banks  and  financial 
intermediaries.  During  inflation  the  public  seeks  to avoid  holding  money 
because of  the depreciation of  the purchasing  power of  money.  The higher 
the  rate  of  inflation,  the  larger  the  implicit  tax  on  money,  and  hence  the 
greater the resources people are willing to devote to avoiding this tax.  One 
natural consequence is the emergence of an industry that makes it possible to 
live  with  a  minimum  of  real  balances  or,  equivalently,  to  speed  up  the 
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Commercial banks and other financial intermediaries are the natural agents 
to promote the moneyless economy, and credit cards are among the vehicles. 
Financial  institutions will establish  branches  in  order to surround  potential 
customers and will attempt to attract deposits by paying  some interest, thus 
helping their customers avoid a complete loss of the purchasing power of their 
monetary  assets.  The proceeds  of  deposits  are  in  turn  re-lent  at  the  high 
nominal  interest  rates  commensurate  with  the  prevailing  rate  of  inflation. 
Deposit  and  lending  rate  differentials  leave  ample  room  for  the  costs 
associated with an expansion of the banking system. The common observa- 
tion,  then,  is  that  during inflation,  bank  branches  and  bank  employment 
mushroom. 
In Argentina this process was clearly evident. The number of branches of 
financial  institutions  increased  by  42  percent  between  1977  and  1985. 
Commercial bank branches increased by 48 percent, and branches of finance 
companies nearly tripled! 
When  stabilization occurs, inflation  disappears  and  so does  the absolute 
size of  the  deposit-loan  rate  spread. There is then  an  extraordinary  profit 
squeeze,  which  forces  banks  to  close  branches  and  sharply  curtail 
employment. The effect is totally predictable, and it is very serious, not only 
from the point of view of labor relations but even more importantly from the 
perspective  of  financial  stability.  A  successful monetary  reform  must  take 
into account the fact that the financial industry is hurt by the end of inflation. 
Mergers,  employment  cuts,  and  a  shift  to  fee-for-service  banking  will 
generally occur in the immediate aftermath of  the stabilization.’ 
We turn next to an analysis of the Argentine experience under the Austral 
Plan. 
5.5  The Austral Plan 
Argentina’s extraordinary macroeconomic  history  reflects  an interplay  of 
adverse  shocks-domestic  and  external, economic  and  political.  But  the 
basic difficulties are two: the unions are inside the country, and the money is 
outside; the unions are British, and public finance is Italian. 
In June 1985 Argentina implemented the Austral Plan, the first stabilization 
program to combine incomes policy  with  an initial dose of fiscal austerity. 
Figure 5.1 shows the recent inflation history of  Argentina. Prior to stabiliza- 
tion, inflation had increased from less than 100 percent per annum toward the 
end of the destructive stabilization attempt under Martinez de Hoz, to nearly 
1,000 percent; since early 1985 there had been a sharp acceleration.  In June 
1985 inflation, at an annual rate, exceeded 6,000 percent! 
5.5.1  History 
rate, industrial production,  and the budget deficit. 
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Fig. 5.1  Monthly inflation (CPI, percent per month) 
Table 5.1  Key Macroeconomic Indicators 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985:l 
Inflation (% per year)  105  165  343  627  918 
Real wageb  96  82  100  123  107 
Real exchange rateb  151  108  100  112  107 
Budget deficit'  13.3  15.1  16.8  12.8  12.0 
Industrial productionb  94  91  100  103  97 
Sources:  Carta Econdmico. Coyuntura Economica, Morgan Guaranty, and BCRA. 
Tonsolidated cash deficit of  the public sector, including operations of  the Central Bank,  % of  GDP. 
bIndex 1983 = 100. 
There is no natural beginning  to the recent inflation bout. The last large 
inflation  had  occurred  toward  the  end  of  the  Peronist  administration,  in 
mid-1975 and early 1976. At its peak, that inflation reached 35 to 50 percent 
per month.8 During  1976-81,  the military government achieved a reduction 
of inflation to an annual rate of less than 100 percent, but that reduction was 
bought  at  the price  of  a  huge  overvaluation of  the  exchange rate,  which 
ultimately  precipitated  massive capital flight and  accumulation  of  external 
debt.'  Successors to  Finance  Minister Martinez  de Hoz  failed to  contain 
inflation at this level,  being handicapped  by  the preceding  debt accumula- 
tion,  the  Malvinas  War  and  the  accompanying  credit  rationing  in  world 
markets,  and a terms-of-trade deterioration. 
A  notable  event  in  the  inflation  history  was  the  deliberate  attempt  to 
reduce substantially the real value of internal debts, public and private, by 
the Dagnino Pastore-Cavallo  team  in June  1982. For  the remainder of  the 
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below  400  percent  while  achieving  some  recovery  of  economic  activity. 
Budget performance  throughout  was  very  poor,  a large part of  the  deficit 
representing losses on exchange rate guarantees granted by the Central Bank 
in the aftermath of the Martinez de Hoz overvaluation. 
5.5.2  Stabilization 
The Alfonsin  government came into power  in December  1983. Initially, 
the government attempted to cope with the problem of inflation by gradualist 
policies. From September 1984 on, an IMF program was in force. Not much 
was  achieved,  however,  in  great  part  because  large  real  wage  increases 
caused  competitiveness  and  budget  performance  to  deteriorate,  forcing 
repeated major devaluations.  The steady worsening of inflation, even in the 
face of halfhearted  attempts at gradualist stabilization, ultimately  forced the 
government to explore a different direction. 
The shift in policies in June 1985 was triggered by two facts. The first was 
that the economy was well on the way to hyperinflation.  Inflation had risen 
from only 18 percent per month at the time of elections to the 25-30  percent 
range. The second  was  that  the  government  faced  elections  in  November 
1985 and  hence  could afford  neither a German-style  hyperinflation  nor  an 
IMF-style depression at that time. 
Perhaps because the possibility of a hyperinflation  was so actively on the 
minds of the economic team, the idea of monetary reform as a comprehensive 
framework for stabilization moved to the center of attention. Because of the 
team's  structuralist  persuasion,  an  incomes  policy  was  thought  to  be  an 
indispensable part of the stabilization. At the same time, the economic team 
had  become distinctly  more orthodox  since the  replacement  of Economics 
Minister Grinspun by Juan Sourrouille, and it recognized that any attempt at 
stabilization  without  budget  consolidation  and correction  of  relative  prices 
would inevitably fail. 
The loss of confidence in gradualist policy and an unwillingness to accept 
IMF austerity per se led to the conception of the Austral Plan of June 1985. 
The plan  struck a balance between  the  fundamentals-monetary  and fiscal 
austerity-and  pragmatism  (or  "good  theory")  residing  in the adoption of 
wage-price-exchange  rate controls as the central feature of the disinflation 
program. The key features of the plan were the following:" 
(a)  The government increased public sector prices, depreciated the exchange 
rate, imposed import duties and export tariffs as well as a forced saving 
scheme.  Some tax  rates  were  raised  and  tax  collection  was  sped  up. 
These measures  were designed  to  improve the  budget  situation and  to 
align key relative prices prior to the freeze.  l1 
(b)  A wage-price freeze and a fixed exchange rate based on the U.S.  dollar 
went into effect until further notice. The wage freeze involved a cut in 
the  real  wage  because  there  was  to  be  no  catch-up  provision  for the 
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time, the purchasing power of wages increased as a result of the reduced 
inflationary erosion of  wages during the payment period. 
A scale of conversion to adjust outstanding contracts for the immediate 
and unanticipated end of inflation was put into place. 
A new monetary unit was introduced, the Austral. The old money was 
allowed to continue to be used and circulate at par. 
The program  was  accepted by the IMF and served as a basis for debt 
rescheduling, with new money financing a significant part of arrears and 
current debt service.  l2 
5.5.3  Two Years Later 
Where has the Austral Plan taken the Argentine economy during the first 
two years? Table 5.2 shows the performance prior to the plan and over the 
subsequent four semesters. The first point to note is that inflation has been 
cut  dramatically,  but  that  it  has  not  disappeared.  On  the  contrary,  by 
mid-1986 it is at a rate of more than  100 percent per year and rising. The 
second point is that economic activity, as measured by industrial production, 
has picked up sharply and is back to the previous peak levels of  1979-80, 
before the Martinez de Hoz experiment crashed. 
The Austral  Plan  thus  has  two  faces.  It has  clearly  failed  to eradicate 
inflation once and for all. But it has brought inflation down from the brink of 
hyperinflation  and  has  achieved  its  results  under  conditions  of  sharp 
recovery. There is no comparable experience under an IMF program. In our 
judgment,  the  Argentine  experience  makes  the  case  for  programs  that 
Table 5.2  Economic krformance and Two Years of the Austral Plan 

























































Note:  For 1985:11, the date refers to August-December. 
"Percent per month. 
%e  interest rate is the active money market rate, percent per month. 
'IMF  measure, including losses of  the Central Bank, % of  GNP. 
dIndex 1983 = LOO.  The wage refers to the  effective real  wage,  adjusting for purchasing power effects of 
inflation. The series is published by FIEL with base of  December 1983= 100. 
'Industrial production is seasonally adjusted, and the series is published by Carta Economics. 
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combine fiscal consolidation with an incomes policy. We return below to the 
insufficient use of  fiscal restraint. 
For  the  pessimist,  the  Austral  Plan  has  at  least  given  Argentina  a 
temporary respite  from a 6,000+  percent inflation.  For the optimist,  it has 
provided  a breathing spell during which to consolidate public  finances and 
restore conditions of  growth under moderate (albeit high by the standards of 
industrial  countries)  inflation.  Whether moderate  inflation  can be  restored 
and sustained is, of course, an open question. 
What  went  right  is  obvious:  there  was  a  significant  correction  in  the 
budget. Part of this correction took the form of a reduced domestic currency 
cost  of  debt  service,  while  much  of  the  correction  came  from  a  sharp 
increase in the real value of  tax collection. This increase reflected an.end to 
the inflationary erosion of revenues,  and the introduction of new taxes and a 
scheme of  forced saving. 
Even  with  these  corrections,  the  deficit  has  remained  very  large  and  is 
growing, as shown in  table 5.3.  Moreover,  there  is  some  question  about 
various  government  contingent  liabilities  which do not  find a place  in  the 
flow measure of the deficit,  but  which represent  a potentially  very  serious 
threat  to fiscal  stability.  At  the  same time, there  remain  several points of 
concern with  respect  to taxation.  For  those  few sectors or households that 
actually pay taxes, rates are probably too high. In addition, some taxes-for 
example, export retentions on agricultural products-are  directly distortion- 
ary  and  have  ease of  collection  as their  only justification.  Thus although 
some fiscal consolidation  is taking place,  public finance remains  a disaster 
area. 
Until April  1986 the government maintained a fixed exchange rate based 
on  the  U.S.  dollar.  Since then,  a  policy  of  mini-devaluations  to  avoid  a 
deterioration of  external competitiveness  has been followed.  The ability to 
hold the real exchange rate relatively constant despite domestic inflation is 
explained by the large depreciation of the U.S. dollar in the world currency 
markets.  A  fixed peg  of  the  Austral  to  the  depreciating  dollar  meant  that 
Table 5.3  The IMF Measure of  the Total  Budget Deficit (cash basis, as a percentage 
of GDP) 
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there was an automatic partial offset against the real appreciation caused by 
domestic wage and price inflation.  The dollar depreciation thus helped carry 
the fixed exchange rate policy for a few months. 
The government at no time committed itself to a zero-inflation target. This 
is  an  important  difference  with  Brazil.  In  Argentina  the  government 
promised  fiscal  stabilization  and  no  money  creation  to  finance  the  budget 
deficit,  while  in  Brazil  the  promise  was  for  inJucuo zero. The Argentine 
government  was  wise  not  to  commit  to  zero  inflation.  The  economy  is 
basically  closed,  and  the  lack  of  competition  makes  it  possible  for  oli- 
gopolistic  firms  and  unusually  aggressive  unions  to  interact  in  sectoral 
games to raise their relative income shares. The political force of the unions 
means  that  the  government  cannot  avoid  sanctioning  most  of  the  wage 
increases and, for employment reasons, most of the price increases as well. 
The Argentine program, after instantly shifting to zero inflation  for a brief 
moment,  moved  immediately into a second phase of  administered inflation. 
An  economy run with  significantly  more slack would perhaps have avoided 
the inflationary pressure, but that might have made for much worse politics. 
There is an  interesting question  as to whence  came the  expansion.  One 
might, perhaps most readily, point to the large and sustained rates of money 
growth, but  several  factors  point  in  the  opposite  direction.  A  contraction 
rather than expansion  should have occurred  when one looks  at the deficit, 
which  declined,  and  at  real  interest  rates,  which  were  extraordinarily 
high-70  or 80 percent per year on an inflation-adjusted basis in the second 
half  of  1985. Among  the  plausible  explanations  for  the  expansion  is  the 
restoration  of  credit,  which  resulted  from  an  increased  time  horizon  of 
economic  actors.  In  the  period  of  intense  inflation,  consumer  credit  was 
unavailable so that consumer durable sales slumped. With the end of extreme 
inflation,  consumer  credit  reappeared,  though  at  extraordinary  real  rates, 
which helped promote demand and production. The restoration of credit is a 
counterpart to a significant remonetization of the economy. Figure 5.2 shows 
the real value of M1 from 1983 to 1987. It is apparent that real M1 doubled 
in the aftermath of the Austral program. 
The second  explanation  relates  to the  purchasing  power  of  wages.  The 
depreciation  and  public  sector  price  increases  on the  eve  of  the  reform 
reduced real  wages.  At  the  same time, however,  the purchasing  power  of 
incomes may  have been increased to some extent by  the  fact that inflation 
came to a halt.  When inflation  slows, the  part of  income not  spent at the 
beginning of  the month more nearly  preserves its purchasing power. Thus, 
the  halt  in  inflation  is equivalent  to  a  shift  in  real  income  toward  labor 
which, in turn, has a high spending propensity. 
The third  explanation concerns the budget.  During the high inflation the 
deficit  was  financed  by  an  inflation  tax.  The fiscal  correction  shifted  the 
burden from money holders to those who pay outright taxes (agriculture and 
large firms, for example). This redistribution may also have been a source of 110  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
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Fig. 5.2  Real M1 (index 1985= 100) 
increased purchasing power for groups which have high spending propensi- 
ties.  But  even with  these factors  in  mind,  the expansion  in  demand  and 
output may not be fully explained. 
5.5.4  What Next? 
At this stage two major concerns about the stabilization program are quite 
apparent. The first  is whether the government can achieve further budget 
correction  and thus provide assurance that  inflation will  remain  moderate. 
Nobody  expects  zero inflation,  but  the  issue  is  whether  inflation  can  be 
reduced  to,  and  held,  around  50  or  100 percent.  Of  course,  there  is the 
question  of  whether  triple-digit  inflation can be  stable. But that  is  more  a 
question of  future shocks than of  the current  problems of  fiscal consolida- 
tion. 
The second problem is the poor growth performance  viewed from a trend 
perspective.  Per capita output today  is more than  10 percent  lower than  it 
was fifteen years ago, and what is worse, the decline in per capita output is 
bound to accelerate.13 Net investment has been  zero or negative for several 
years in a row,  and there is no prospect of  a change. These facts bring  out 
the link between stabilization and growth. Stabilization and recovery involve 
primarily the demand side; but at some stage in the recovery, considerations 
of growth and the supply side must enter. 
The budget correction  is required  not only to contain excess demand and 
inflationary  pressure  but  also to promote investment. The link between  the 
budget and investment  occurs through two channels. The first is credibility 
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inflation, they will expect the government to use tight money to make up for 
a lack of  fiscal consolidation.  Tight money presents the firm with the risk of 
being caught  in  investments  with  a high  cost of  debt  service  and  with  no 
customers. Hence firms are reluctant to invest, instead responding to demand 
using price increases and overtime rather than durable expansion in capacity 
and employment. 
The other link between  the  budget  and  investment comes  from the  side 
of  resource  constraints.  In  a  fully  employed  economy,  resources  for 
investment can only come from reduced consumption, reduced government 
spending, or increased  net  imports.  To  cut  government  spending  is  the 
popular  option, but  it  has  proved  to  be  politically  impossible,  at least  in 
the  short term.  Reduced consumption  can, indeed, be achieved by a fiscal 
tightening.  This is the correct option in a country where only 4 percent  of 
total  tax collection comes  from income taxes.  Finally,  resources can come 
from  abroad.  That  would  pose  the  problem  of  increased  external 
borrowing,  perhaps  in the form of forced  lending by the creditor banks or 
reduced  spreads. It  also  brings  out  the  need  to  liberalize  restrictions  on 
imports  so that  potential  investors  actually  have  access to foreign  goods. 
Increased  foreign  borrowing  should  certainly  be  part  of  an  investment 
campaign in that it bridges the short-run  political problems  and provides a 
disinflationary effect. 
It is doubtful that the investment and growth problem can be solved by the 
budget alone. The budget  can, at best, help provide  a favorable context in 
which other forces can promote investment.  The most favorable sign at this 
time  is  the  prospect  of  an  Argentina-Brazil  common  market.  Such  a 
development would give weight to the productive forces of the economy and 
might well be the decisive event that restores investment and growth. With a 
return  of  growth, public  finance  problems  and  distributive  quarrels  might 
well retreat to the background.  In the next chapter we turn to these questions 
by  looking  closely  at the  links  between  growth  and  the  budget.  In  that 
context, of course, the issue of external debt service takes a prominent place. 
But  before  we  move to these  topics,  we briefly  look  at the issue  of  the 
political  popularity of the Austral Plan. 
5.6  Politics 
A very interesting and important aspect of the new stabilization programs 
is their political impact. They were initiated by governments already sharply 
weakened by  their failure to stabilize.  But, while stabilization  is perceived 
ordinarily  as  politically  difficult  and  harmful,  these  new  programs  have 
catapulted  the  politicians  and  technicians  who  initiated  them  to  near 
immortality, at least initially. Alfonsin, who was the first president to attempt 
a full-fledged stabilization with incomes policy support, must be given credit 
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Public opinion  surveys provide  a ready  means  of  checking  on the  poli- 
tical  success of  the  stabilization  plans.  We  therefore  review  some  of  that 
evidence here to reinforce the dramatic contrast between the food riots  that 
occasionally emerge in the course of IMF programs and the extraordinarily 
positive response in these cases. 
5.6.1  Public Opinion 
Data from a continuing opinion survey, SOCMERC, allows an assessment 
over time  of  the  public's  response  to policy  and  management.I4  The data 
reported  in table 5.4 show the fraction of  the sample assessing the perfor- 
mance as positive. The notable point in this table is the immensely positive 
response  to the  Austral  Plan  and  the  sharp  improvement  in  government 
popularity  on  all  counts  between  May  and  August  1985.  Moreover,  the 
positive response has been quite persistent. Even after the initial enthusiasm 
wore  off,  there  was  still  very  substantial  support,  as is evident  from  the 
December  1985 rating. In addition,  a public opinion poll at the end of  1985 
showed that 35 percent of the sample felt that the Austral Plan had helped 
them  and  a  further  42  percent  estimated  that  it  had  not  affected  them 
significantly, while only 9 percent felt that they had been strongly hurt. Only 
18 percent of the sample felt that the plan should be abandoned.I5 
5.6.2  Explanations 
Why  do these  new  programs  bring  forth  such  strong  public  support, 
whereas traditional programs are viewed as a political liability? We see two 
immediate explanations. 
Perhaps the most important  aspect of these new stabilization programs is 
that they occur in a context of  sharply accelerating and extreme inflation.  It 
is well known  that the public  views  inflation  as utterly  threatening.  If  this 
view  is  accurate  for  the  moderate  inflation  experienced  in  the  industrial 
countries,  then  it  is  quite  likely  even  more  accurate  for  the  extreme 
experiences reviewed here. The strong public reaction  observed in this case 
far exceeds  what  economists  can  explain  in  terms  of  the  economics  of 
inflation.'6 By  the  same  token,  price  controls  are  invariably  a  popular 
political move any time inflation is perceived as a problem. Using controls to 
stop accelerating inflation thus amounts to a well-known  recipe in political 
Table 5.4  Percentage of SOCMERC Sample Responding Positively to the Government 
December 1984  May 1985  August  1985  December 1985  April 1986 
Austral Plan  74  68  52 
Economic management  19  10  40  35  19 
Government in general  46  35  57  52  36 
President Alfonsin  12  64  74  71  64 
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economy. More in-depth research in the psychology of inflation and controls 
is therefore certainly  warranted. 
It is striking to note that the public is actually willing to accept the need for 
sacrifices in order to secure stabilization. A survey in Argentina found that 46 
percent of the respondents were willing to make personal sacrifices to help the 
success of  the Austral  Plan, while  another 46 percent  said they could  not 
reduce their standard of living further. Only 8 percent were unwilling to do so. 
Fiscal stabilization is also popular in that it does not involve a reduction in 
aggregate real  absorption  of  goods  and  services in the private  sector.  The 
adjustment  only  involves  a  change  in  the  incidence  and  distribution  of 
taxation.  An inflation tax finances the government during the high inflation 
period,  whereas  outright  taxation  finances  basically  the  same level of  real 
government spending after stabilization.  Since no current account improve- 
ment is required for stabilization,  the whole program  amounts for the most 
part to a reshuffling,  within the country, of the burden of  financing a given 
real level of  government spending. 
There may also be redistributions between sectors. For example, industries 
that collect sales taxes (say, the tobacco industry in Argentina) lose out when 
the float disappears, and workers gain from the stability of real wages. These 
redistributive features differ from the case of a country in which stabilization 
requires an improvement in the current account and hence a net reduction in 
aggregate absorption. 
Of  course, with rising inflation  and increasing  focus on fiscal problems, 
and  a resulting  emphasis  on  tax  collection,  the  Austral  Plan  was  losing 
popularity during 1986-87.  Table 5.5 shows the evaluation  from a survey 
for both Alfonsin and the Austral Plan. The data reported in this survey offer 
a  preview  to  the  poor  electoral  performance  of  the  radical  party  in  the 
September 1987 election. 
5.7  Concluding Remarks 
The new  stabilization programs  in  force in Argentina  (and in Israel and 
Brazil)  represent  a  critically  important,  viable  alternative  to  traditional, 
Table 5.5  Recent Evaluation of Alfonsin and the Austral Plan (percentage 
of respondents) 
Alfonsin’s Management  Austral Plan 
Positive  Negative  Positive  Negative 
July 1986  51.0  19.0  32.0  29.5 
December 1986  47.5  26.5  21.5  42.0 
July 1987  37.0  36.5  14.5  59.0 
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orthodox,  IMF-style  programs.  They  grasp a  central  economic  fact-the 
need  for  coordination  rather  than  sheer  slack-as  an  essential  part  of 
stabilization.  From  a  political  point  of  view  they  are  dramatically  suc- 
cessful,  at  least  in  the  initial  stage,  and  as  such  they  are  feasible.  Of 
course,  without  coming  to  grips  with  the  fundamental  problem  of  the 
budget, this program, like the Gelbard stabilization shown in table 5.6, had 
to fail. 
Programs  using  incomes  policy  as  an  explicit  part  of  stabilization 
represent  an  important  advance  in  macroeconomic  policy,  but  even  so, 
they  do  not  afford  miracles.  There  is  no  substitute  for  a  correction  of 
fiscal  disorder,  the  orthodox  part  of  stabilization.  Perhaps  surprisingly, 
governments  seem to be  unwilling  to use the  very  strong  improvement  in 
their  political  standing  to  follow  up  on  the  initial  stabilization  with  a 
program  of  enduring,  substantial  improvement  in  public  finance.  This 
unwillingness  is  very  shortsighted  because  any  program  will  ultimately 
buckle under  as a boom and  shortages force the  return of  inflation.  There 
may be no outright collapse, at least for a long time, but the program tends 
to  melt  away  gradually  for  lack  of  sustainability,  credibility,  and 
confidence. As a result,  political support inevitably falls off.  And  with  the 
loss  of  support,  the  chances  of  achieving  important  changes  in  public 
finance  fall.  The  chance  of  turning  from  stabilization  to  growth  is  thus 
missed. 
A return to sustainable, long-term growth continues to be a pressing issue. 
In  the  three  years  prior  to  the  Austral  Plan,  investment  had  declined 
significantly,  and the supply  potential  has  expanded  little  since then.  The 
important changes in public finance which are required to promote long-term 
financial stability have not taken place. The lesson is that the incomes policy 
approach to stabilization does not dispense with the need for orthodoxy, but 
it does provide a rare political opportunity  in the form of a brief  breathing 
spell and the momentum of popular support for the hard task of fundamental 
policy reform. 
Table 5.6  Four Stabilization Programs (monthly Rate of Inflation) 
Krieger-Vasena  Gelbard  Martinez de Hoz  Sourrouille 
November 1967  May  1913  March 1977  June  1985 
Previous three months  1.2  6.9  8.8  28.3 
Month of stabilization  2.4  3.5  3.9  25.1 
After stabilization 
1st year  0.7  I .o  8.7  3.4 
2d year  0.7  4.8  8.5  6.5 
3d year  I .5  19.6  6.8  11.9 
Source: Carta Econdmico. 